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A Logical Extreme 
Proposing Human Rights as the Foundation 
for Workers’ Rights in the United States 
James A. Gross
Cornell University 
A few years ago, Summers (1998) deplored how a labor law that 
made it the public policy of the United States to “encourage the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining” and was intended to enable 
workers to participate in the decisions that affect their workplace lives 
had been turned into governmental protection of (even encouragement 
of) employers’ unilateral decision-making authority and hierarchi-
cal workplace control. Similarly, a recent Human Rights Watch report 
(2000) found that “workers’ freedom of association is under sustained 
attack in the United States.” Neither the Summers article nor the Hu-
man Rights Watch report revealed any previously unknown violations 
nor deficiencies. 
The power of these two works lies elsewhere: in Summers’s call for 
a new vision in deciding what rule changes are necessary to reaffirm the 
values of collective representation, and in Human Rights Watch’s use of 
international human rights standards to judge U.S. employers’ respect 
for workers’ rights and the government’s exercise of its responsibility 
to promote and protect workers’ rights. Inherent in Summers’s position 
is the understanding that the basic foundation of law is moral choice, 
whether that choice is made by legislators, judges, members of admin-
istrative agencies, arbitrators, negotiators of collective bargaining con-
tracts, or unilateral rule-makers in human resources departments. His 
position acknowledges, moreover, that there is an unavoidable and of-
ten powerful subjective component to decision makers’ choices among 
alternative rules. Consequently, it is simply not enough to know the 
rules of labor law and labor relations. Those rules must be probed care-
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fully and thoroughly because they embody value judgments concerning 
every vital aspect of labor relations, including the sources of worker 
and employer rights, which rights get priority when they conflict, and 
the nature of the relationship between employer and employee.
An honest reexamination of U.S. labor law and policy, therefore, 
must discuss values and moral choices. Moreover, the use of interna-
tional human rights principles as the standards for judging those choices 
constitutes a long overdue beginning toward the promotion of worker 
rights as human rights (Gross 2003). This combination of values analy-
sis and human rights standards provides the new vision or new perspec-
tive that Summers believed was necessary. 
This chapter addresses the implications of applying this new vision 
for, among other things, worker rights; labor law and policy; our un-
derstanding of the judicial, administrative and arbitral decision-making 
process; union-management strategies; and even the future character 
of industrial relations research. Recognizing worker rights as human 
rights, for example, means that property rights–based, “free” market va- 
lues will have to give way to the values of human rights that have not 
historically influenced U.S. labor law and policy despite the fact that 
the human rights values are most consistent with the nation’s professed 
democratic ideals. Consequently, this chapter will be specific concern-
ing the overall significance of this new vision and will discuss in more 
depth a few examples concerning the freedom of association, labor ar-
bitration and contract administration, human resources values, and the 
nature and role of labor organizations. 
Identifying and analyzing the values underlying labor relations rules 
and policy choices will also broaden the industrial relations research 
agenda and require new approaches to that research. This could make 
industrial relations research truly interdisciplinary because understand-
ing underlying value premises means understanding and applying his-
tory, law, philosophy, ethics, economics, religion, and the international 
and comparative aspects of all these disciplines. This will also require 
broadening the methodology of industrial relations research beyond 
quantitative techniques and opening for examination subjects previ-
ously not considered because they were not quantifiable. It would rein-
troduce concepts such as justice and injustice to a field that has come 
to disparage the “normative” as unscientific and subjective; ill-befitting 
the objective, value-free social scientist.
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This chapter does not aim to discuss the philosophical foundation 
of human rights or to justify worker rights as human rights. Suffice it 
to say, therefore, that the chapter accepts the propositions that human 
rights are a species of moral rights that all persons have simply be-
cause they are human, not because those rights are earned or acquired 
by special enactment or contractual agreements; that all human beings 
are sacred; and that the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR) as well as the International Covenant on Cultural 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) assert the interdependence of political and 
economic rights (Steiner and Alston 1996).
We study people at workplaces. If every person matters because 
every person has rights by virtue of being a human being, then it is time 
we begin in a serious and systematic way to include these human rights 
in our research.
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are the rights that all persons have simply because 
they are human. This is not the place to discuss the philosophic founda-
tions of human rights, which historically have their sources in many 
religious doctrines and theories of natural law that led to the Lockean 
natural rights theory—the theory most associated with modern human 
rights (Shestack 1998). More recently, the post–World War II revulsion 
against the horrors of the Holocaust, in which certain individual human 
beings counted as nothing, resulted in the 1948 adoption of the UDHR.1 
The UDHR, combined with the International Covenant on Cultural and 
Political Rights2 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights,3 constitute an International Bill of Rights (Don-
nelly 1989).
Those human rights, which include a wide range of personal, legal, 
civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, are necessary not 
merely for life, but for a life of dignity (Donnelly 1989, p. 24). Viola-
tions of those rights deny a person’s humanity. It is generally under-
stood that legal rights arise from the law, contractual rights arise from 
special agreements such as collective bargaining contracts, and moral 
rights arise from accepted principles of righteousness. In ordinary cir-
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cumstances, however, human rights take priority over those “conven-
tional rights.”
For example, in the United States, the right not to be discriminated 
against now can be claimed as a constitutional right, a federal and state 
statutory right, a court decision–based right, or a contractual right in a 
collective bargaining agreement. At various times in this country’s his-
tory, however, the Constitution treated African Americans as less than 
fully human and permitted slavery, the Supreme Court upheld segrega-
tion based on race, state legislatures in particular ratified Jim Crowism, 
and collective bargaining agreements commonly contained provisions 
that discriminated against African Americans. Regardless of this wide-
spread legal, contractual, and “moral” approval of racial discrimina-
tion, the treatment of African Americans as if they were less than fully 
human was a violation of their most fundamental human rights. This 
underscores the fact that the existence of human rights does not depend 
upon the approval of legislatures, courts, other institutions, or the will 
of the majority. One has the human right in question, “whether the law 
is violated or not, whether the bargain is kept or not, whether others 
comply with the demands of morality or not” (Donnelly 1989, p. 12).
Persons are no less human beings with human rights when they be-
come employees and, as employees, they are no less entitled to respect 
for their human rights. Consequently, the employer–employee relation-
ship is more than economic in nature (see, for example, Werhane 1985). 
People can be rendered powerless and have their human rights violated 
not only by governments but also by employers who have more power 
to affect people’s lives on a daily basis than do governments. Yet, while 
assertions of individual rights and freedom are commonly made against 
the exercise of power by the state, persons are routinely required to 
leave their rights and freedom outside factory gates and office build-
ings with barely a murmur of protest. Consequently, too many workers 
stand before their employers not as adult persons with human rights 
but as powerless children or servants totally dependent on the will and 
interests of their employers (Gross 1998).
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WORKER FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A full human life requires the kind of participation in the politi-
cal, economic, and social life of the human community that enables 
people to have an influence on the decisions that affect their lives. That 
means people must have sufficient power, individually and collectively, 
to make the claims of their human rights both known and effective so 
that respect for their rights is not dependent solely on the interests of 
the state, their employers or others. Servility, or what some call power-
lessness, is incompatible with human rights. Consequently, the freedom 
of association, which includes the right to organize, to bargain collec-
tively, and to strike, is so essential that it is commonly accepted as the 
“single human rights standard by which all regimes, all societies, all 
countries can be judged” (Kahn 1998).
Article 20 of the UDHR issued by the United Nations in 1948 as-
serts the right to freedom of association, including in Article 23 (4) the 
right to form and join trade unions. The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which the United States ratified in 1992, incorpo-
rates in Article 22 the language of the Universal Declaration: “Every-
one shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his inter-
ests.” Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which the United States has not signed, also affirms the 
“right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his 
choice.” The International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) 1948 Conven-
tion Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise (Convention 87) and 1949 Convention Concerning the Appli-
cation of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collec-
tively (Convention 98) address in great part the exercise of the freedom 
of association rights set forth in the International Covenants. Another 
major international consensus document is the ILO’s 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which obligates all ILO 
members (the United States is a member) to promote certain core labor 
rights, the first of which is the freedom of association.
The application of the underlying values–human rights standard ap-
proach to the old U.S. issue of employer speech in union representation 
election campaigns and organizer access to employer property provides 
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a good illustration of the implications of utilizing this new perspec-
tive. The current general rules are well established: An employer may 
express views about unionization as long as those views contain “no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit”; (Section 8(c) of the 
Taft-Hartley Act)4 an employer may require employees to attend, on 
company time, “captive audience” meetings during which antiunion 
speeches are made, whereas a union has no right to reply on company 
time;5 employees may orally solicit for a union in working and non-
working areas but only on the employees’ own nonwork time6 and may 
distribute union literature only in nonwork areas on their own time;7 
and nonemployee union organizers have no right of access to employ-
ers’ property for organizing purposes.8 
These rules are much more than “the law”; they ought to be seen as 
value choices. In this country, historically rooted principles of employer 
property rights still override the basic right of freedom of association. 
The value choices in the current rules are the antithesis of what the 
Wagner Act and early NLRB decisions intended. Rights clash—here 
the right of freedom of speech, property rights, and the right of freedom 
of association—and, when rights conflict, choices must be made. The 
Wagner Act established the most democratic procedure in U.S. labor 
history for the participation of workers in the decisions that affect their 
workplace lives (Gross 1998). At its core was the promotion and protec-
tion of the freedom of association. The Wagner Act was not neutral; the 
law declared it to be U.S. policy to encourage collective bargaining and 
to protect workers in the exercise “of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment and other mutual aid and protection.”9 The Wagner Act was 
a moral choice against servility. Wagner also understood, however, that 
government encouragement and protection are essential to the exercise 
of participatory rights at the workplace.
The rulings of the first NLRB, for example, were most consistent 
with the protection and promotion of the freedom of association be-
cause they required employers to remain strictly neutral in regard to 
their employees’ organizational activities. It was convinced that any 
antiunion statement by an employer to employees who depended on 
that employer for their livelihoods was bound to carry an implied threat 
of economic reprisals for disregarding the employer’s wishes. For the 
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same reason, early NLRBs held that captive audience speeches were in 
themselves unfair labor practices regardless of the content of the speech 
delivered (Gross 1995, pp. 104–107).
Labor never came close to achieving the system of workplace de-
mocracy envisioned by Wagner. As many experts correctly predicted 
at the time, the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act became 
law in 1947, the language asserting the right to refrain from collec-
tive bargaining (Section 7),10 the addition of several union unfair la-
bor practices (Section 8(b)),11 and the provision asserting employers’ 
right of “free speech”12 would be read as a statutory justification for 
employer resistance to unionization and collective bargaining. More 
than 50 years after Senator Wagner warned it would happen,13 Sum-
mers (1998, p. 1806) pointed out that “employer speech has become the 
primary instrument used by employers to discourage unionization and 
collective bargaining.” The dominant hierarchy of rights established by 
these rule-makers and subsequent rule-interpreters has given employer 
speech and property rights priority over employees’ rights of freedom 
of association.
Human rights are standards more fundamental than statutory or even 
constitutional standards. Consequently, the fundamental human right of 
freedom of association outweighs employer property and speech rights 
at the workplace. In 1992, the United Food and Commercial Work-
ers and the AFL-CIO filed a complaint with the ILO’s Committee on 
Freedom of Association against the U.S. government, charging that the 
Supreme Court’s Lechmere14 decision gave private property “absolute 
priority over rights of freedom of association, whenever [nonemployee] 
union organizers are involved” (Gross 1999).
The Freedom of Association Committee, in its recommendations, 
requested the U.S. government “to guarantee access of trade union rep-
resentatives to workplaces, with due respect for the rights of property 
and management, so that trade unions can communicate with workers 
in order to apprize them of the potential advantages of unionization” 
(Gross 1999). That recommendation has been ignored. This could be ac-
complished, however, without unfairly limiting or damaging legitimate 
employer interests simply by granting nonemployee union organizers 
access to employer property to meet with employees in nonwork areas 
on nonwork time. That is the recommendation of the Human Rights 
Watch report (2000, p. 20), which also advocates “more free speech for 
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workers not less speech for employers” rather than repeal of Section 
8(c).
The Human Rights Watch recommendation is less persuasive when 
applied to employer election campaign speech in general and captive 
audience speech in particular. Employer speech is a powerful weapon 
that promotes the coercion of employees in their human rights to union-
ize, and has resulted in an increase in union losses in representation 
elections and a decline in union strength and union membership as a 
percentage of the labor force (Block and Wolkinson 1986). Even al-
lowing more employee speech and union access would not offset the 
inherently coercive effect of employer speech. What justification can 
there be for permitting employers to continue to resist, discourage, and 
coerce those workers who exercise their human right of freedom of as-
sociation?
The application of this perspective—the combination of values 
analysis and human rights standards—to the old issue of employer 
speech and union representation election campaigns makes it clear that 
the rules currently in place are the result of deliberate moral choices 
that violate a fundamental human right: workers’ right of freedom of 
association. Understood in that context, this becomes a more powerful 
indictment more likely to be effective in bringing about change.
It is a fact that Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act set forth employees’ 
right to refrain from representation and collective bargaining. It is also 
a fact that the UDHR says that no one may be compelled to belong to 
an association. It is also a fact that in the United States workers have 
routinely been denied a free and uncoerced choice concerning represen-
tation and collective bargaining.
Even if workers had a free and uncoerced choice concerning the 
exercise of their freedom of association right, however, there are, as Ad-
ams (2003) argues, “some choices that result in conditions so morally 
repugnant that they cannot be allowed.” Using the ILO’s core Principles 
and Rights at Work as a model, Adams points out that we do not per-
mit people to sell themselves into slavery or states to choose apartheid, 
or children to prostitute themselves. From a human rights perspective, 
because freedom of association is a fundamental human right, the issue 
to be decided is not whether there ought to be democratic participation 
by employees at their workplaces but “rather what form democratic 
participation ought to take” (p. 153).
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LABOR ARBITRATION
When the exercise of the right of freedom of association is suc-
cessful, however, and collective bargaining produces a written labor-
management contract, the protection and promotion of workers’ rights 
depend in great part on the values of those decision makers, particularly 
labor arbitrators, who interpret and apply those agreements. This has 
led to the acceptance and repeated application of rules—what arbitra-
tors often call the common law of arbitration—without questioning, or 
knowing, or caring about a rule’s origin or what the rule assumes about 
the “oughtness” of the power and rights relationship of employees and 
employers or whether a rule needs to be reexamined, reevaluated, mod-
ified, or rejected. 
Substantive rules are ways of looking at the workplace—in other 
words, whether we see the workplace through the eyes of employees on 
the shop floor, in offices or classrooms, or from the perspective of those 
who manage the enterprise. It is a question of who is benefited and 
who is burdened by a particular rule or standard. Arbitrators, as well as 
courts and administrative agencies, have been the creators, choosers, 
appropriators, and implementers of these substantive rules. These rules 
or doctrines go far beyond the rules unions and employers negotiate 
into their collective bargaining agreements.
Related research demonstrates that labor arbitrators have embraced 
the generally conservative values of common law but have resisted ap-
plying the principle of external law, have rarely utilized constitutional 
principles, and have ignored human rights concepts. Arbitral common 
law shows a commitment to extracontractual doctrines of private prop-
erty rights; employer hierarchical authority and control; management 
freedom to operate the enterprise most efficiently; and the need to disci-
pline employees whose actions were considered challenges to manage-
ment’s order and control (Gross 1988a,b; Gross and Greenfield 1985). 
These embody value judgments that, as Rabin (1985) has put it, “reflect 
the interests of the dominant power in the work relationship.”
The value choices arbitrators make in deciding cases involving em-
ployee refusals to work for reasons of health and safety provide good 
examples. The controlling rule in these cases is the long-established 
arbitrator-created principle: work first, grieve later. As a consequence of 
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labor arbitrators’ almost universal value judgment that management’s 
freedom to operate the enterprise and direct the workforce is superior 
to all other rights, including workers’ right to a safe and healthful work-
place, they treat these cases as insubordination cases and do not except 
unusual health hazards from the obey first, grieve later rule.15
The insubordination orientation to these cases, moreover, relegates 
workers’ safety and health claims to that of an affirmative defense to the 
insubordination charge. Arbitrators, consistent with their value choices 
in these cases, also place upon these workers the heaviest possible bur-
den of proof, namely, to submit objective evidence of an unhealthful 
and unsafe workplace. Although employers carry the burden of proof 
in discipline cases, the practical effect of these value choices is to shift 
this burden on the decisive issue (health and safety) to the discharged 
or otherwise disciplined employee. This maximizes an employer’s con-
trol of employee discipline and thereby minimizes employee interfer-
ence. The management rights framework used in these cases results in 
decisions that place property rights and other factors such as profits, 
efficiency, cost–benefit considerations, management authority, and eco-
nomic progress over human rights. 
The “obey first, grieve later” rule itself is value laden. It favors 
management control and the need for efficiency, maintenance of disci-
pline and order at the workplace, and private property ownership and 
prerogatives over union and worker protests about working conditions. 
The notion that management acts and the union reacts gives employ-
ers the right of initiation as well as broad discretion in deciding how 
to assert its own interpretation of the contract. Employees and a union, 
however, may not use self-help when they seek to assert their interpre-
tation of the contract. In addition, the employee who may not exercise 
self-help at the workplace has recourse only to the grievance-arbitration 
process where an arbitrator will apply the same management rights and 
authority value judgments that underlie the obey first, grieve later rule.
Some are favored by this rule and some are disfavored. The rule 
favors management authority and objectives but often confronts em-
ployees with an unfair dilemma—in safety and health cases, for ex-
ample, to obey and risk their health and safety or to refuse to work and 
risk their jobs. Recognizing workers’ rights to refuse hazardous work 
without retaliation would enable them to take control over and protect 
their own lives when confronted with threats to their safety and health. 
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But the current value scheme treats workers as children, or as prisoners, 
or students, or members of the armed forces, who, if not controlled, will 
act irresponsibly (Atleson 1985). 
Many international declarations, covenants, and treaties, such as the 
ILO constitution, the Declaration of Philadelphia, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, and various regional treaties and trade agreements recog-
nize workplace safety and health to be a human right.16 In commenting 
on the “inexplicable” exclusion of worker safety and health from the 
ILO’s Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work, Spieler (2003, p. 94) 
writes the following:
It can be argued that postponing the improvement of health and 
safety until market forces can effect change is analogous to post-
poning the release of political prisoners who may die in prison un-
til a despotic government is replaced through democratic elections. 
It is in fact the right to life that we are talking about when we talk 
about workplace safety . . . The right to life is deeply imbedded in 
every human rights declaration and it is presumed in these decla-
rations that individuals’ lives must be protected from those who 
wield unequal power. This is precisely the issue in occupational 
safety and health.
As Spieler says, workplace safety and health are essential com-
ponents of the right to life. A value judgment that would make work-
ers’ right to a safe and healthful workplace paramount would place the 
highest value on a life, or a limb, or an eye and give absolute priority 
to individual rights over institutional and economic interests. It comes 
down to the fact that the dignity and human rights of workers must lie at 
the center of any industrial relations system (Javillier 1996). As former 
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz (1971) told the National Academy of 
Arbitrators over 30 years ago, “The individual as the owner of rights 
and interests—job rights, personal rights, human rights—[is] at least 
as much entitled to protection as a piece of real estate or machinery.” 
He added that the individual is “somebody the system is designed for 
instead of the other way around.”
Application of the human rights standard to refusal to work for rea-
sons of health and safety cases would require a reordering of values 
so that workers’ human right to workplace safety and health would be 
32   Gross
given priority over employers’ freedom to operate the enterprise and 
direct the workforce. The major change in the arbitral approach to these 
cases would be in the recognition that worker self-help is essential. That 
would release them from the unfair work and risk their safety and health 
or refuse to work and risk their job dilemma.
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: VALUES, OBJECTIVES, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Personnel management, as it was known in a less sophisticated time, 
consisted of management activities that were employee oriented, such 
as recruitment, training, and staffing. Personnel managers were seen 
as “people persons,” employee advocates, management’s conscience, 
described by one as the “in-house Socialist[s] focused on feel-good 
events” (Ellig 1997, p. 273). 
Regardless of the accuracy of those perceptions, even the old-style 
personnel administrators managed employees with the ultimate objec-
tive of increasing their productivity. Still, many academics, particularly 
in industrial sociology, human relations, and personnel administration, 
vigorously defended their research against critics who charged that it 
was intended to help management achieve its objectives. In the last de-
cade, however, human resources academics and practitioners openly 
advocate that human resources professionals become strategic partners 
in executing business strategy (moving “planning from the conference 
room table to the marketplace”); working to increase employee com-
mitment to the organization; and becoming change agents, enabling 
the business to shift, move and adapt while constantly decreasing costs 
and improving efficiency (Ulrich 1998). The overwhelming number of 
employees have no advocates at the workplace. Human resources de-
partments cannot be advocates for employees when their primary re-
sponsibility is defined as “deliver[ing] the behaviors needed to realize 
business strategy” (Beatty and Schneier 1997). As respected academic 
Thomas Kochan put it, “Tilting too far in the direction of becoming an 
advocate for employee concerns would do little other than re-marginal-
ize the function within the management structure” (Kochan 1997).
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What being an “employee champion” really means is developing 
employee assets in order to achieve competitive advantage and win in 
the marketplace. That requires making the employer’s goals the person-
al goals of each employee. That objective is best achieved by attracting 
and retaining people who share an employer’s core values and purposes 
and letting those who do not share those values go elsewhere (Collins 
and Porras 1998).
Loyalty and commitment, however, run in only one direction. The 
human resources literature is full of references to the new “psychologi-
cal contract,” which makes employees responsible for their own em-
ployability and gives them no job security. A leading textbook, granting 
that many see “employee separations” negatively, points out several 
benefits, including the possibility that “a persistently low turnover rate 
may have a negative effect on performance if the workforce becomes 
complacent and fails to generate innovative ideas” (Gomez-Mejía, 
Balkin, and Cardy 1995). One prominent authority refers to downsiz-
ing as “clearing debris” and “yard work” (Ulrich 1998). To ensure that 
employers avoid any commitment to their workers, they are advised to 
include at the end of employee handbooks a declaration that employees 
can be discharged for any reason or no reason and that the handbook is 
not an employment contract. The objective, the textbook explains, is to 
avoid any restriction on an “employer’s freedom to discharge employ-
ees without cause” (Gomez-Mejía, Balkin, and Cardy 1995, p. 435).
Clearly, it is not only the state that has the power to violate people’s 
rights; employers in many ways have even more direct power over indi-
viduals’ lives. Judged against a human rights standard, it is an injustice 
that human beings are treated as things or resources for others to use. A 
human being has the right to be free from domination regardless of the 
source. Judged by a human rights standard, moreover, human resources 
personnel and other managers in a business organization would be held 
accountable for manipulating human beings and subordinating their 
rights to the interests of the organization. As Shue (1980, p. 78) writes, 
“to enjoy something only at the discretion of someone else, especially 
someone powerful enough to deprive you of it at will[,] is precisely not 
to enjoy a right to it.” If the boss giveth, then the boss can taketh away, 
and victims will have no defense without established forms of partici-
pation available to them. Inducing workers to see the world through 
their employer’s frame of reference to legitimize and maintain employ-
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er control of the workplace without changing the power relationship of 
superior employer and subordinate employee constitutes manipulation 
that is an affront to human beings and human rights.
This critique of human resources values, methods, and objectives 
using a human rights standard for judgment echoes the critics of the 
so-called Mayo School of Human Relations of a half-century ago. They 
rejected the belief that workers needed to submerge self in a business 
organization and to accept their employer’s goals “in order to find 
freedom” (Landsberger 1958). They also objected to the perception 
of workers as means to be manipulated to bring about acceptance of 
management’s purposes. They charged that the basic conflict of interest 
between management and labor had been ignored, as had the associ-
ated issues of conflict resolution, which they said had been reduced to 
ways for employees to blow off steam without changing the hierarchi-
cal authority structure or permitting employees to share that power. Fi-
nally, these critics accused the Mayo School of an active antiunionism, 
demonstrated in part by excluding unions as sources of worker power 
and participation and considering them only as external intrusions on 
management authority and flexibility or as symptoms of deficiencies in 
internal management.
It is still human resource doctrine, for example, that unionization 
is caused by bad management; that unionization is the misfortune that 
befalls an employer with flawed human resources policies and practices 
(Adams 2006). That completely ignores the fact that people’s right to 
participate in the decisions that affect their lives is one of the most fun-
damental human rights principles as well as one of the most fundamen-
tal principles of democracy. Regardless of the quality of management 
or a firm’s “good” or “bad” employee relations, exercise of the freedom 
of association at the workplace is necessary to give workers the op-
portunity to secure their own rights and interests through participation 
in workplace decision making and to eliminate the vulnerabilities that 
leave them at the mercy of others.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The U.S. labor relations system is dominated by employer power 
premised on the inequality and helplessness of most workers and rooted 
in values that justify the possession and exercise of that power. In this 
chapter, the application of a new vision—the combination of values 
analysis and human rights standards—to the freedom of association, la-
bor arbitration, and human resources of U.S. workplaces demonstrates 
that employer power has been used to violate the fundamental human 
rights of workers in this country. A just society would not permit this or 
tolerate anything less than the end of these violations.
The adoption and application of human rights standards to U.S. la-
bor relations would require more than marginal adjustments or fine-
tuning; it would require an explicit restatement of property rights as 
subordinate to human rights, including the human rights of workers. It 
would also require a major change in the priority given to the rights and 
interests of the parties in conflict; a major redistribution and sharing of 
power at the workplace; a major reevaluation of the values currently 
influencing dispute resolution in judicial, administrative agency and ar-
bitral hearing rooms, and at bargaining tables; as well as major changes 
in many other areas, such as exclusive representation, the permanent 
replacement of economic strikers, and the exclusion of workers from 
laws intended to protect the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
including the exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act of agri-
cultural and domestic workers. There will be no lack of labor-manage-
ment conflict here mainly because power will be at stake as well as 
basic and irreconcilable values. No pretension of unitary goals could 
keep a lid on that conflict.
It has been argued, correctly in my opinion, that only the people 
whose rights are at stake can force a government or a private enter-
prise to respect human rights. Both union leaders and members need 
to become educated in human rights. Unions must do more than orga-
nize workers; they will need to understand that they are human rights 
organizations because human rights such as freedom of association, 
collective bargaining, safe and healthful workplaces, and discrimina-
tion-free workplaces are at the core of what unions seek to secure. The 
labor movement will need to be more than just another interest group 
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protecting its members regardless of the cost to others if it is to appeal 
to the poor and vulnerable people most in need of organization. Instead, 
unions will need to develop alliances with other social movements such 
as civil rights groups, women’s rights organizations, environmental 
groups, immigrant worker support groups, and religious organizations. 
Until now, human rights principles have been disseminated from the 
top-down by a privileged elite in governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations. Organized labor could be a powerful mass human rights 
movement spreading those principles from the bottom-up. This, of 
course, will require union leaders and members to determine the extent 
to which they have accepted the values underlying the current labor 
relations system. Human rights values also impinge upon the power 
and authority of unions and their leaders. For many reasons, it is easier 
to evade moral imperatives, especially when, in this country, the right 
of freedom of association has been respected only for brief periods of 
time.
It is not unrealistic to believe in and work for change. The civil 
rights and women’s rights movements in this country are among the 
precedents that justify some optimism and hope. No matter how dis-
couraging the prospects for fundamental change in our labor relations 
system, it would be even more irresponsible to fail to act. Change can 
begin with the ability of challengers to redefine a policy issue. New 
perspectives on the employer–employee relationship, such as the new 
vision advocated in this chapter, can bring about major changes in the 
way people respond to that relationship.
What is certain, however, is that human rights talk without action is 
hypocrisy in the form of self-righteous posturing pretending that human 
rights violations occur only somewhere else. An honest reexamination 
and reassessment of U.S. labor relations values using human rights 
standards would be a long overdue beginning toward the promotion 
and protection of worker rights as human rights.
Notes
 1.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) of Dec. 10, 1948, UNGAOR, 3d. SESS., Resolutions, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 71.
 2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
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 3.  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 UNTS (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
 4.  29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1947).
 5.  Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400 (1953).
 6.  Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
 7.  Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
 8.  Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
 9.  Pub. L. No. 74–198, 49 Stat. 449–50 (1935) [codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 141–44, 167, 171–87 (1947)].
 10.  29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
 11.  29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1947).
 12.  29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1947).
 13.  Robert Wagner, “The Wagner Act—A Reappraisal,” 93 Cong. Rec. A895, A896 
(1947), reprinted in 2 LMRA Legis. Hist. 935, 938.
 14.  Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
 15.  For an expanded discussion of the value judgments inherent in arbitral doctrine 
on employee refusals to work for reasons of health and safety, see Gross (2004), 
which provides the basis for the discussion of arbitration of health and safety 
disputes in this chapter. 
 16.  ILO Conventions are available on the ILO Web site: http://www.ilo.org/.
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